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ABSTRACT
Despite the impressive progress in the field of presentation attack detection and multimedia forensics
over the last decade, these systems are still vulnerable to attacks in real-life settings. Some of
the challenges for existing solutions are the detection of unknown attacks, the ability to perform
in adversarial settings, few-shot learning, and explainability. In this study, these limitations are
approached by reliance on a game-theoretic view for modeling the interactions between the attacker
and the detector. Consequently, a new optimization criterion is proposed and a set of requirements
are defined for improving the performance of these systems in real-life settings. Furthermore, a novel
detection technique is proposed using generator-based feature sets that are not biased towards any
specific attack species. To further optimize the performance on known attacks, a new loss function
coined categorical margin maximization loss (C-marmax) is proposed which gradually improves the
performance against the most powerful attack. The proposed approach provides a more balanced
performance across known and unknown attacks and achieves state-of-the-art performance in known
and unknown attack detection cases against rational attackers. Lastly, the few-shot learning potential
of the proposed approach is studied as well as its ability to provide pixel-level explainability.
Keywords Presentation Attack Detection · Deepfake Detection · Generalizability · Game Theory
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, there have been major break-throughs in the fields of manufacturing, computing, and commu-
nication, resulting in cost reduction as well as higher availability of manufacturing and synthesis processes to the
public. Among the beneficiaries of these advancements are the attackers of biometric and forensic systems, taking
advantage of these methods to devise new and more powerful attacks. Consequently, biometric and forensic systems
face new challenges every day as they have to become secure systems against a wider range of attacks happening at a
higher frequency. Making the matters worse, the existing solutions are often designed against a specific attack (or set
of attacks) in controlled environments and lack the capacity to face the challenges of real-life deployment. As such,
addressing the vulnerabilities of existing solutions and the introduction of methods to mitigate these vulnerabilities is of
utmost importance for the deployment of these systems in practice.
One aspect of challenges for deployment that is rarely studied is the selection process of a rational attacker. It is
expected for an attacker with an ever-growing menu of options for attacking to behave rationally and choose the most
powerful attack available to him to maximize the chance of infiltration. Furthermore, as the defender does not have
knowledge or access to massive amounts of data for all possible attacks available to attackers, his detector would
probably be tasked with the detection of unknown attacks or attacks from which only a few training examples are
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available. Additionally, lack of explainability limits the use of a system in high-stake applications while explainability
increases their utility when operated by a human supervisor.
In this article, to address these challenges, a game-theoretic approach is considered for the formulation of the interactions
between the attacker and the detector. Resulting from this, an optimization criterion is formulated and a set of
requirements are defined for designing the detector accordingly. To tackle the problem of unknown attack detection and
few-shot learning, the use of unbiased compressed feature sets is proposed, and for targeting the optimal performance, a
new loss function is defined faithful to the formulated optimization criteria. Finally, the explainability of the proposed
method is demonstrated with a few examples. The rest of this article is organized as follows: In section 2, the related
literature is reviewed and a theoretic basis for the proposed approach is established in section 3. Afterward, the proposed
method is introduced in section 4 and the case study experiment setup is explained in section 5. Finally, the results of
the experiments are reported and analyzed in section 6 and 7 and the article is concluded in section 8.
2 Literature Review
Considering the task of forgery detection or presentation attack detection on the face modality, there exist three relevant
threads of research. First is the field of multimedia forensics, and more specifically, anti- counter forensics (CF). This
thread of research takes an adversarial view on the problem and tries to optimize the performance of the detection
system facing an adversary who is actively working towards undermining the performance of the detector. Second is
the field of presentation attack detection (PAD) in which the objective of the detector is to secure a biometric system
against attacks from different presentation attack species (PAS). Lastly, the newly established thread of Deepfake
detection is considered which was established to address the new phenomenon of availability of automated open-source
photo-realistic digital video manipulation techniques on the internet.
In this article, the terminology proposed for the field of presentation attack detection is relied on. Consequently, the act
of forgery is called attacking the detector and generation techniques used by the forger are called attack species.
2.1 Anti Counter Forensics
The majority of solutions in the literature are designed neglecting the fact that an attacker works actively to undermine
the performance of the detection system [1]. To address the vulnerability to CF attacks, many anti-CF techniques have
been developed, with a focus on detecting the traces left by the CF technique. Anti-forensic techniques often target a
specific CF technique, and as a result, an obvious problem occurs when the attacker anticipates the use of the anti-CF
technique and adjust accordingly. In turn, the defender would need to resort to the introduction of a new detection
system to detect the anti-CF attacks, resulting in a never-ending iterative loop with unforeseeable outcomes [2].
A possible solution to this problem is to design techniques that are intrinsically more resistant to CF attempts. One
way is to use a larger feature space for detection, using features such as higher-order statistics. For example, in [3] the
authors propose the use of second-order statistics derived from co-occurrence matrices and show robustness against CF
attacks. Furthermore, in [4], Chen et al. enhance double JPEG compression artifacts and use Markov random process to
utilize the second-order statistics for double JPEG compression detection. Noise-level inconsistencies between different
parts of an image are also used for exposing image forgery in [5].
The feature set used by the detection method can also be optimized for robustness against CF attacks. Zhang et al. [6]
use a reduced feature set based on assumptions on the attacker’s data manipulation strategy, which shows improved
classifier security against such attacks. A combination of one-class and two-class classifiers is proposed in [7] by
learning a decision function that encloses BF samples in the feature space more tightly. Another interesting approach
is the randomization of the feature selection process [8] to force the attacker to invest in attacking the entire feature
space, while the detector can do fine-grained detection on the selected features for improved security. In [9] and [10],
the authors propose the reuse of the original feature space for the detection of CF attacks by retraining for the task of
double JPEG compression detection.
The third group of solutions rely on game theory to model the interactions between the detector and the attacker and
improve the performance of the detector at the final equilibrium [11]. In [12], the authors propose a new detection
technique that can detect video frame deletion anticipating the probable use of CF attacks. Barni and Tondi [13] derive
the asymptotic Nash equilibrium of the interactions in the source identification game and calculate the conditions under
which a successful multimedia forensic analysis is possible.
All the aforementioned methods address the case where the attacker has a limited choice of CF attacks and do not
consider the selection process of attacks in the optimization of the detector.
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2.2 Presentation Attack Detection
Similar to anti-CF techniques, the existing PAD research can be categorized into three branches: (1) PAD systems that
address specific PASs, (2) PAD systems that increase or optimize the feature set to detect a higher variety of attacks,
and finally, (3) PAD systems that rely on game theory to model the interactions between attacker and defender and
optimize the PAD performance accordingly.
The early PAD methods addressed PAD for specific PAS, examples of which are methods relying on features such as
blinking, head movement, and textures [14, 15, 16]. The majority of PAD techniques rely on features that are specific
to print and replay attacks. Features such as 2D Fourier spectrum [17], local binary patterns (LBP) [18], histogram
of oriented gradients [19], difference of Gaussians [20], scale invariant feature transform [21], and speeded up robust
features [22] have been used for print and replay attack detection. In [23], the authors propose the use of central
difference convolutional networks which use central deference convolutions that are designed after LBP features [24].
Many PAD methods rely on an augmented feature set using additional hardware. Examples include 3D depth camera
[25], multi-spectral camera [26], and microphones [27]. However, these techniques require the addition of often
expensive hardware to the pipeline, which may not be feasible in all applications.
A few studies try to use generalizable feature sets for PAD. One feature set that is considered for this purpose is
image-quality related features. In [17], the authors propose the use of image distortion analysis using specular reflection,
blurriness, chromatic moment, and color diversity as features. The use of 25 general image quality features for PAD is
investigated in [28] on fingerprint, iris, and 2D face modalities. In [29], a regression function is learned to map the image
quality assessment scores to classifier parameters for classification. The use of pixel-level supervision for improving
feature set performance is also investigated in [30] using estimation of depth and remote photoplethysmography and in
[31] using regional self-supervision.
A limited number of studies tried to address the generalizability of PAD systems using a one-class classification
approach. In [32], the authors compare the performance of 20 different one-class and two-class classifiers and conclude
that the anomaly-based one-class classifiers are not inferior to two-class ones in the face of unknown attacks. The use
of one-class classifiers is also investigated in [33] where the authors demonstrate better generalization against unknown
attacks on an aggregated dataset. A deep metric learning model is proposed in [34] in which a metric-softmax loss
is introduced for learning a more discriminative feature representation in embedding space and outperform all the
state-of-the-art methods by a considerable margin. Lastly, in [35], a zero-shot PAD system is introduced based on
tree-based partitioning of samples into semantic sub-groups in an unsupervised fashion.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no game-theoretic approach is proposed for modeling the interactions between
the attacker and the defender and optimization of PAD performance accordingly.
2.3 Deepfake Detection
Similarly, the approaches for Deepfake detection can be categorized into similar categories. Among proposed approaches
that try to detect samples from a specific generation technique, a detection approach is proposed in [36] for computer-
generated imagery (CGI) based on a lack of asymmetry in generated images. The spatiotemporal deformations of a 3D
face model are also explored for the detection of CGI in [37] relying on the fact that natural faces show a wider range of
deformation compared to the synthetic ones. The use of periodic blood flow is considered as a discriminative feature
in [38]. Similar methods have been applied for the detection of Deepfakes relying on generation flaws [39], blinking
[40], and blood flow [41]. Face warping artifacts have been studied in [42] relying on the resolution difference in the
spliced portion of the video. Further studies have investigated the use of face landmark locations [43] and head pose
consistencies [44]. Generative adversarial networks (GAN) produce certain artifacts relating to color synthesis and
saturation which are used for detection in [45] and [46] respectively. The idea of detecting GAN-generated images
using architecture-specific GAN fingerprints was proposed in [47].
A number of more general-purpose detection methods are introduced recently, including the use of mesoscopic features
[48], general-purpose deep convolutional neural networks (CNN) [49], attention mechanism [50] and capsule networks
[51]. Some methods take into account the temporal aspect of videos and propose the use of long short-term memory
(LSTM) networks [52], recurrent CNNs [53], and optical fields [54]. It has been shown that most of these detectors
tend to overfit to the known attacks and show limited generalizability [55].
The problem of generalization has been studied in a few articles. An auto-encoder based detection scheme is proposed
in [56], adapting to new attacks with few examples. Furthermore, pixel-wise masks are used in auto-encoders for
enforcing the model to learn intrinsic representations and avoiding overfitting to training data in [57]. Incremental
learning has also been proposed for adaptation to new attacks [58]. To avoid the detector from focusing on low-level
GAN artifacts, these artifacts are suppressed in a preprocessing step in [59], while in [60] transferability of the network
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is improved by pre- and post-processing as well as data augmentation. The time dimension has also been utilized in
[61] along with attention mechanism and adversarial training. Blending artifacts [62] can also be used for detection
relying on the common trait of attacks in splicing the synthetic region on natural footage. A one-class approach is
proposed in [63] by using learned camera fingerprint information from multiple frames.
Most studies have a heavy focus on GAN generated images and do not consider other types of manipulations such
as CGI based methods and face-swapping. Furthermore, none of the aforementioned studies take into account the
rationality of the attacker nor the case in which the attacker has multiple choices of attack species.
3 Theory
In this section, I introduce the definition of a rational attacker and formulate such an attacker’s pay-off equation
and decision-making process. Furthermore, I discuss the detection strategy facing such an attacker and define the
requirements for a PAD system accordingly. Lastly, I justify the use of one-class detection techniques based on
generative models for unknown attack detection.
3.1 Rational Attacker
In most existing literature the selection process of the attackers for which attack species to use is neglected and assumed
to be that of random selection, resulting in the proposed detectors having fundamental weaknesses. A rational attacker is
defined as an attacker who, knowing the pay-offs to his possible choices, selects the one with the highest pay-off. From
a game-theoretic perspective, the interactions between an attacker x and the defender can be modeled by a sequential
asymmetric game in which the defender chooses a detector after which the attacker administers their attack of choice.
An attacker would have to choose among a set of attack species Ax which represents all his options. The pay-off ui for
the attacker for an attack ai ∈ Ax can be formulated as:
ui = r(1− pi)− cfpi − ci
= r − pi(r + cf )− ci
∼= −pi(r + cf )− ci
(1)
where r > 0 is the reward for a successful attack, pi is the probability of detection (detection rate) for the attack species
ai, cf > 0 is the cost of failure for the attacker, and ci > 0 is the cost of the attack. To account for the budget of the
attacker, I assume the budget allows all attack species that are in Ax, and any attack that requires a higher budget is
excluded from Ax.
The attacker can, with the help of trial and error as well as consultation from the experience of other attackers, have
an accurate estimate of pi for ai ∈ Ax. The attacker’s goal is to choose an attack species that maximizes the pay-off
function if the highest pay-off is higher than the pay-off of not attacking the system. As r + cf is constant for every
individual attacker, the optimization corresponds to the selection of an attack species with the lowest weighted sum
depending on pi and ci. In practice, it is fruitful for the defender to take ci into account, and low-cost attack species are
expected to occur more frequently than the high-cost ones. However, because measuring ci for individual attack species
falls outside the scope of this study, we assume the worst-case scenario in which the cost of all possible attack species
are assumed zero, enabling all attackers to use more effective attacks regardless of the cost of the attack, as long as
their budget allows the attack to be included in Ax. Consequently, the pay-off formula boils down to ui ∼= −pi, and the
choice of the attacker would be the attack with the lowest pi, referred to as the most powerful attack (MPA). The values
for pis depends solely on the choice of the detector by the defender.
3.2 Multiple Attackers
A detection system faces not only one attacker but different attackers with different sets of Ax. Gathering statistics about
the availability of attack species to the attackers would provide further knowledge about the probability of observing a
specific MPA during the detection scenario. However, as such statistics are often not available for individual attackers, a
conservative approach would be to construct a union set of all possible attack species for groups of attackers AXk and
assume all attack species in AXk are available to all attackers from category k. By doing so, the PAD scenario is further
simplified as the distinction between individual attackers collapses and all attackers in each category become identical.
For example, using the budget as a categorizing factor, the attackers can be categorized to low-budget and high-
budget and the attack set for low-budget attackers AXl and high-budget attackers AXh can be constructed. Next,
using the probability of an attacker belonging to each category p(Xk) and the performance of the detector D on
the MPA from that category perf(AXk |D), the expected overall performance of the system can be estimated as
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∑
k p(Xk)× perf(AXk |D). Other examples of categorizing factors are expertise, time-budget, and access to unknown
attacks or anti-forensic attacks. As the categorization of the attackers and calculation of the probability of attackers
belonging to each category falls outside the scope of this study, we assume a single category AX for all attackers. From
here on, we use the term attacker to refer to the hypothetical attacker that can administer all attacks in AX .
3.3 Detection Strategy
For deciding the best detection strategy, the accurate estimate of detection rate for individual attack species by the
attacker can be interpreted as equivalent to having full knowledge over the detection performance over all ai ∈ AX .
Due to the sequential nature of the game, the defender needs to choose pis for individual attack species before the
attacker decides which attack to choose. Subsequently, the rational attacker will choose the MPA which has the lowest
detection rate depending on the defender’s choice of detector.
Let us assume the set A which denotes all possible attack species. In A, two attack species are considered different if
they have different manufacturing/generation process, including generation parameters such as manufacturer expertise,
quality, and obfuscation. From the perspective of an attack detection system, an attack species can be categorized into
one of three subsets: (1) Known attack species (Ak) to which the detector is exposed in the training process and its
performance optimized, (2) Unknown attack species (Au) to which the detector is not exposed to and its performance is
unknown, and (3) Anti-forensic attack species (Aa) signifying the attack species that are designed with knowledge over
the weaknesses of the detector in mind and render the detector useless. These three subsets cover the whole set A. It is
important to mention that these subsets can be expanded as new attacks are invented (become possible) and added to A.
To the extent of the knowledge available to the defender, Ak constitutes the set of all possible attack species, all while
the attacker may be able to administer attacks falling outside Ak. The defender can know the detection rate for attack
species in Ak and optimize them accordingly, however, he cannot know the detection rate for attack species in Au. The
best the defender can do in this case is to make an educated guess of what the minimum detection rate can be for attack
species in Au. To achieve this, every individual attack species in Ak can be left out as an imaginary unknown attack
species during training, and the minimum detection rate across all leave-one-out (LOO) trials can be used as a rough
estimate of the detection rate across MPA in Au.
The pay-off for the defender can be formulated as
vi = −cd − cm(1− pi), (2)
where cd is a constant cost of detection, cm is the constant cost of missed detection, and pi is the probability of detection
of attack ai which matches the definition of pi for the attacker. Knowing that the attacker will choose MPA, i.e. the
attack species with the lowest pi, the defender’s best strategy would be to maximize the minimum pi across both Ak
and Au to maximize vi. There is a further objective of reducing the detection cost such that cd is not prohibitively large,
i.e. cd << cm(1− pi). The defender needs to choose to maximize pi either for ai ∈ Ak or ai ∈ Au, while limiting cd
according to the application dependant cm. As mentioned in Section 3.2, it is also possible to categorize the attackers to
the ones with access to attack species from Au and the ones without, and define an objective function that takes into
account the minimum detection rate over both Ak and Au. Yet, as the defender does not possess any knowledge over
Au, it logically follows that he does not have any knowledge about the probability of the attackers being able to use
attacks that belonging to Au either, and would need to resort to an educated guess of the probability instead. In this
study, I try to maximize the detection rate for MPA from Ak and Au independently, corresponding to the cases where
AX ⊂ Ak and ∃ai ∈ AX , ai ∈ Au respectively, and propose a fusion scheme that can be used to combine the resulting
detectors.
3.4 Requirements
Following the aforementioned explanations, the following set of requirements can be defined for a detection system:
• It should have an optimal minimum detection rate across known attack species.
• It should have an acceptable minimum expected detection rate across unknown attack species.
• It should be able to learn to detect an unknown attack species optimally once it becomes known by a few
examples.
• The cost of detection should not outweigh the cost of miss-detection.
• It should be robust against adversarial attacks.
The first two requirements can be directly justified according to the formulation of the problem provided in Sections 3.3.
The third requirement follows directly from the first two for the case when an unknown attack species becomes known.
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In this case, the newly known attack species qualifies for a known attack species and should follow the first requirement,
even though there might exist only a limited number of available examples from it. Consequently, the detector should
be able to learn to increase the detection rate of the previously unknown attack species to match that of known ones.
There are certain solutions in the literature that attempt to address the last requirement [8], however, to the best of the
author’s knowledge, there exists no method to prove the robustness mathematically, and empirical proofs would be
limited to the specific anti-CF attacks that are considered. Consequently, for a detector to achieve robustness against
adversarial attacks, it needs to survive the test of time. As such, fulfilling this requirement falls outside the scope of this
study.
3.5 Generation-based Feature Sets
It is common practice to rely on discriminative models for the detection of attacks. However, the objective of a
discriminative model requires it to focus on the discriminative features between bona fide (BF) and known attack
species. Consequently, these models do not learn discriminative features that are not directly useful for the detection
of the presented known attacks. As such, these models often fail to infer information on unknown attacks where the
discriminative feature set is different from the learned ones. In contrast, the objective of a generative model trained on
BF data requires it to model all the variability in the BF data to the capacity of the model, and because of this, does not
over-represent some features while under-representing the others. Using feature sets extracted by a generative model, a
detector would be intrinsically robust to unknown attack species as it has access to the whole feature set, only limited
by the capacity of the generator in learning the feature set corresponding to BF data.
Hence, generative models can be used for anomaly extraction more effectively in the unknown attack detection scenarios.
Even though the features extracted using the generative model are not optimized for detection and might not outperform
the discriminative features used by a discriminative model on known attacks, it can be demonstrated that they would
generalize better on unknown attack species as they have no bias regarding what the attack should look like.
4 Proposed Method
According to the requirements defined in Section 3.4, two separate detection methods are proposed for both scenarios
of known and unknown attack detection. Furthermore, a fusion mechanism is introduced to combine the decision of the
two detectors for a unified solution. Both proposed methods rely on pixel-level generator-based anomaly features and
its compact representation extracted to achieve better performance across unknown attack species. For the purpose
of known attack detection, a new loss function is introduced which follows the defined objective of maximizing the
minimum detection rate. For the purpose of unknown attack detection, I construct a generator-based one-class detector
that relies on attack-unspecific anomaly-sensitive information extracted from the detection pipeline.
4.1 Pixel-Level Probability Distribution Modelling
A distribution model for BF images can provide an ideal model for presentation attack detection, as it would be possible
to use it to measure the likelihood of an observation to the BF distribution. However, due to the complexity of the
distribution of BF images, the large amounts of data needed to train such distribution properly, and finally the curse of
dimensionality, it is deemed impractical. However, by breaking down the problem into modeling segments of an image
rather than the whole image, there exist practical solutions.
PixelRNN [64] is one such solution that models the pixel intensity value probability distribution conditioned on previous
pixel values in raster order. This approach can be used to calculate log-likelihood values for observing individual pixels
in an image, and once these values are aggregated, they can be used to estimate the log-likelihood of observing the input
image as a whole. The pixel-level log-likelihood values can further be used for the localization of low-likelihood pixels
(anomalies) in the input. In the proposed approach, the aggregated log-likelihood value is used as the first anomaly
measurement for the one-class classifier, and a dimensionality reduction scheme is proposed for simplification of the
description of the localization information for extracting the second anomaly measurement as well as training the
proposed discriminative detector for the known attack detection system.
4.2 Dimensionality Reduction
The pixel-level log-likelihood values provide valuable information about the severity of the anomalies at each location
in the image. However, dealing with features the same size as the input video proves challenging, especially when
the amount of training data is limited. To tackle this problem, the following dimensionality reduction scheme is
proposed: As the location of anomalies in expected to remain roughly constant in a video, we can average the pixel-level
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log-likelihood values across the cropped face frames across the whole input video. This step will serve two purposes,
firstly it collapses the data in the time dimension, and secondly, it reduces the noise in the frame-level representations.
Next, we use a principal component analysis (PCA) transformation learned on BF data to reduce the dimensionality
further.
PCA transformation extracts the directions where the variability of the BF data is most explained. It can also be used to
extract the directions in which the input data shows little variability. The components for which the BF data shows
little variability fits well with the definition of anomaly features, and they are a good representation of the similarities
between the BF samples. Additionally, the unexplained variability of input after transformation to the PCA space can
provide further anomaly clues. This unexplained variability can be measured as the distance between the input and its
projection on the PCA hyper-plane. We augment the PCA transformed features with the measurement of unexplained
variability. The resulting compact representation manages to conserve the discriminative information in the input video
effectively while reducing the dimensionality further by a factor of ≈ 1000.
The amount of shift across the PCA dimensions where BF samples show little variability, along with the unexplained
variance measurement can directly be used for one-class detection. To reduce it to a single score, the energy of the
input across these dimensions can be calculated by calculating the norm of the signal across them. However, as the
unexplained variability is on a different scale compared to the PCA transformation values, a normalization step is
required. Normalization can be done by making the distribution of the BF samples across these dimensions zero-mean
unit-variance.
4.3 Categorical Margin Maximization Loss
As the performance of a system is measured according to its performance for MPA, a new loss function needs to be
introduced that optimizes the detector accordingly. In this approach, I introduce categorical margin maximization loss
(C-marmax) that weighs attacks according to the difficulty of classification. Using C-marmax, the network transforms
the aforementioned compact representations to embeddings on a unit hyper-sphere where the distance between the BF
data and attacks are maximized while the distance between attacks from the same species, as well as BF samples to
each other, is minimized. In this loss, the distances between attacks from one species to other species are ignored as
we don’t have any information about the similarity or dissimilarity between distribution across any two attack species.
Hence the detector is categorical as it only considers distances between observations from different categories (i.e. BF
vs attacks) for calculating the loss value. Furthermore, the loss attributed to the anchors is exaggerated according to
the distances such that the network pays more attention to marginal anchors to fulfill the objective of maximizing the
minimum detection rate.
In attack detection scenarios, there are a few classes, and it is possible to rely on the distance to the center of distribution
in a batch rather than the distance between individual samples. To this end, in each batch, we measure the location of
the center of distribution for each attack species as well as BF data on the unit hyper-sphere, and according to the label
of the inputs, we use these centers to measure the distance of the anchor to the positive distribution dp and the negative
distribution dn. To achieve the maximum margin possible between the distribution of BF samples and PA samples in
the embedding space, a fixed margin is not defined. Instead, the ratio dpdn is used for the maximum dp and minimum dn
in a batch from each class, requiring the numerator to be minimized to zero, while the denominator is maximized to the
maximum possible value of 2 on the unit hyper-sphere. To avoid the loss value to become infinity when dn is zero, the
ratio is modified to dpdp+dn which is equivalent to
dp
dn
when dp << dn. Furthermore, to exaggerate the loss for marginal
observations (where dp is high) in comparison to non-marginal observations (where dp is low), exponentiation is used,
and the resulting formula becomes ( dpdp+dn )
g .
As the defined loss does not maximize the distance between centers of distributions directly, to assure that the center of
distributions are far from each other, the minimum distance between two centers are floored at
√
2 corresponding to 90
degrees on the unit hyper-sphere, with a second loss term. The final loss function is summarized as follows:
lossm = (
max{d(a,Cp)}
(max{d(a,Cp)}+min{d(a,Cn))} )
g
lossc = max{min{
√
2− d(Cp, Cn)}, 0}
loss = lossm + 0.1× lossc
(3)
where, d stands for euclidean distance, a signifies the anchor, Cp is the center of the positive class, Cn is the center of
the negative class, g is the exaggeration factor, lossm is the margin loss, and lossc is the center loss. During decision
making, the euclidean distance to the center of BF distribution can be used for scoring. This distance can further be
converted to an attack detection probability value by division by 2.
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4.4 Unknown Attack Detection
As argued before, a discriminative model may overfit to certain discriminative features that correspond to the bias in
known attack species used in training. This holds for the presented C-marmax loss, as even though it tries to achieve a
balanced attack detection performance across known attack species, it may exclude discriminative features that may
be important for the detection of unknown attack species. As such, to detect unknown attacks, a one-class detector
is proposed which does not have a bias towards any specific attack species, or in other words, for it all attacks are
unknown. As explained in Section 4.1, the log-likelihood value of observing an image serves as a good general-purpose
anomaly detection measure. However, this metric does not include the other important discriminative feature available
in the pixel-level log-likelihood data, namely the location information. As explained in Section 4.2, the location relevant
anomalies can be represented by the components in a PCA transform trained on BF where the BF data show the least
variability. Furthermore, this representation can be augmented by the unexplained variance in the form of the distance
of an observation to the PCA hyper-plane. Finally, the energy of the signal across the resulting representation after
normalization can be used as an anomaly score. Following these steps, a second location-sensitive anomaly measure is
derived. Assuming a Gaussian distribution for BF scores for both anomaly measures, using the BF distribution, one can
calculate the likelihood of an observation belonging to the BF distribution as the final probability score. For the final
score of the one-class detection scheme, we simply average the two resulting likelihood scores from the log-likelihood
measure and the PCA-based measure.
To fuse the probability scores from the discriminative detector and the one-class detector when they are employed
together, we use the following logic: If the discriminative detector decides that a sample is an attack, it most certainly
is one. However, if the discriminative detector decides that the sample is a BF, the defender cannot be sure that the
sample is a BF as it might come from an unknown attack. So the one-class detector is to be consulted for a decision.
This two step decision logic can be interpreted as using an OR gate on the decision of the discriminative and the
one-class detector decisions. However, as both systems provide a probability scores rather than a decision, considering
that A ∨B = A+B −AB = A×B, the following fusion formula is proposed that mirrors the logic level decision
making:
pPA(x|D,O) = 1− pBF (x|D)× pBF (x|O)
= 1− (1− pPA(x|D))× (1− pPA(x|O)) (4)
where pPA corresponds to the probability of belonging to the attack category, pBF corresponds to the probability of
belonging to the BF category, and O and D correspond to one-class and discriminative detector models.
5 Experiment Setup
For measuring the effectiveness of the proposed method, its application on both tasks of presentation attack detection
and Deepfake detection are considered. In this section, a description of the datasets used is provided, followed by the
parameters used in training. Lastly, the measures used for evaluation of the method are described.
5.1 Datasets
To show the performance of the proposed method for presentation attack detection, the SiW-M dataset [35] is selected
due to its large collection of presentation attack species. Similarly, the FaceForensics++ dataset [49] is chosen for the
task of Deepfake detection as it contains the widest choice of species between the available datasets.
5.1.1 SiW-M
This dataset consists of 660 BF videos from 493 subjects from diverse ethnicity and age. Furthermore, it includes
966 PA videos from 13 different PAS collected under various environmental conditions, extreme face pose angles and
lighting conditions. The videos are around six seconds in length. This dataset is specifically designed for the evaluation
of generalization performance across unknown PAS. The attack species in this dataset are categorized into replay, print,
mask, makeup, and partial attacks. The PAS available in this dataset are form a diverse set of attacks including print and
display attacks as well as transparent masks and impersonation makeup. This dataset also includes PAS corresponding
to partial attacks.
For training the models, 530 randomly chosen BF videos are used, while 65 randomly chosen BF videos were kept for
development purposes, leaving 65 videos for testing. For training the classifier in the unknown case, a LOO setup is
used and for each attack species, all the videos from other attack species are used for training, along with the training
and development BF data. For few-shot learning, an additional randomly chosen one or five videos from the targeted
attack species are included in the training, while in the known case 50% of the videos are included.
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5.1.2 FaceForensics++
FaceForensics++ dataset contains four PAS corresponding to Deepfakes2, Face2Face [65], Faceswap3, and Neural
Textures [66]. The dataset contains 1, 000 BF videos and 1, 000 videos from each PAS, each split into three sets,
reserving 72% for training, 14% for validation and allocating 14% for evaluation. The videos are collected from
YouTube and after manipulation, recompressed in three video qualities for evaluation of performance under various
compression levels. For the purpose of analyzing performance over unknown attacks, only the non-compressed version
of the data is used. Similar to the SiW-M dataset, both known and LOO unknown attack detection experiments are
considered.
5.2 Parameters
The proposed method has a number of parameters corresponding to face detection, the pixel-level log-likelihood
extraction model, the PCA model, and finally the classifier. In this study, the videos are considered as a set of frame
images. The face region is extracted in each frame after face detection using the Dlib toolkit [67], and the cropped faces
are resized to 128× 128.
The overall pipeline of the proposed detection mechanism is visualized in Figure 1 along with information about
where the training data, development data, and known attack data is used. The input image is first processed by the
PixelCNN++ model trained using the training data, resulting in an aggregated observation log-likelihood and pixel-wise
log-likelihood matrices. The aggregated observation log-likelihood is compared to the distribution of BF values learned
from development data to acquire the first generator-based anomaly measure. The pixel-wise log-likelihood matrices are
further normalized to zero-mean unit-variance using the distribution of pixel values in the training data before applying
the PCA transform. The PCA transform is learned using the training data, and the PCA transformed representation is
augmented with the unexplained variance measure and normalized to zero-mean unit-variance across all dimensions
using the development data. Then after sorting the components based on the explained variance of training data in
descending order, the last components are used for calculating the norm. This value is then compared to the distribution
of BF scores learned on development data for calculating the second generator-based anomaly measure. The first and
second probability scores are combined by averaging, resulting in a single one-class classification score. The augmented
and normalized PCA representations are then passed to the discriminative classifier trained on BF data from training
and development set along with attack data from known attacks.
Figure 1: The pipeline of the designed detection mechanism for both the discriminative classifier and the generator-based
one-class detector. The red, green, and blue arrows signify the use of the data in the training of the models pointed to.
The gray arrows correspond to the flow of the probe data.
2https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap
3https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/
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5.2.1 PixelCNN++
For pixel-level log-likelihood matrix extraction, a PixelCNN++ [68] model is trained on the resized cropped face images
extracted from the BF training data. The model consists of three hierarchies with five ResNet layers in each, with 160
filters with a receptive field of 3× 3 in each layer, resulting in 95 million parameters. Concatenated ELU [69] is used
for activation and pixel intensity values are modeled using 10 logistic distributions. For regularization, dropout with a
probability of 50% is used. The model is trained with a batch size of one and the ADAM [70] optimizer with a learning
rate of 10−5 is used for 500 epochs on a single randomly chosen frame per training video in each epoch.
The log-likelihood matrix is then generated by concatenating the pixel log-likelihood values for each of the 10 logistic
distributions for each color channel, resulting in a matrix of size 128× 128× 30. For calculating the log-likelihood
of observing the video, the likelihood of observing each individual frame is calculated using the weighted sum for
the individual logistic distributions across the whole cropped face image. These values are then averaged across time
to measure the average log-likelihood of the observed input video to be used for one-class detection. For extracting
location-sensitive features, after averaging the pixel-level log-likelihood matrix values across the whole input video, at
each pixel location, the distribution of log-likelihoods are normalized such that the BF training data has a distribution of
zero-mean unit-variance, resulting in a matrix of size 128× 128× 30 per video.
5.2.2 Principal Component Analysis
In the next step, these matrices are extracted from the BF training data to train a PCA model with sorted components
according to the explained variance across these components in descending order. Unexplained variance is measured by
calculating the euclidean distance between each input and its projection on the PCA hyper-plane and added to the end
of the PCA representation. The PCA representation is normalized to have zero-mean unit-variance for BF data from
the validation set. For one-class detection, to measure the energy of the input video across the last 10% of the PCA
representation, the norm after normalization is used. Using the distribution of the norm values across the validation
data, a single Gaussian model is trained for calculating the likelihood of a given input to the BF distribution. The same
approach is taken for the video log-likelihood values collected directly from the output of the PixelCNN++ model.
These two likelihood values are averaged to calculate the final score of the generator-based one-class detector.
5.2.3 Classifier
The PCA representation is also used for the training of the discriminative classifier using the aforementioned loss
function. A DNN model with four hidden layers, each with 512 ReLU activated units is trained for mapping its input
to the L2 normalized embedding space of six dimensions. Due to the limited amount of training data available for
training the classifier, dropout regularization with a rate of 50% is used on the output of each hidden layer, along with
L2 regularization with a factor of 10−6. Oversampling is done by using random segments of the training videos and
their vertically flipped copies while testing is done on the whole test videos. The training data is balanced by repetition
to have 50% BF samples and 50%#PAS . The loss function only has one tunable parameter g, which was set to two to
achieve fast conversion. Training is done with a batch size of 128 for 100 epochs with a fixed learning rate of 10−3
using the ADAM optimizer. Finally, the detection probability score is calculated by measuring the Euclidean distance
of the embedding to the average of the validation data embeddings divided by two. The fusion between the probability
score calculated by the generator-based one-class detector and the discriminative detector is done using the formula in
Section 4.4.
5.3 Metrics
To evaluate the performance of the proposed system, the threshold less equal-error-rate (EER) metric is used. EER
measures the error rate when the missed detection percentage is equal to the false alarm percentage. For evaluation of
performance across all attack species, the EER value for the MPA is chosen by measuring the maximum EER across all
species. Furthermore, the detection error trade-off (DET) curve is used for showing the missed detection rate for each
false alarm value. Missed detection corresponds to the bona fide presentation classification error rate (BPCER) and
false alarm corresponds to attack presentation classification error rate (APCER) in ISO/IEC 30107 terminology4.
6 Presentation Attack Detection
In this section, the adequacy of the proposed generator-based anomaly representations is first explained. Later, the
performance of the proposed method based on these representations is evaluated and compared to the existing solutions
4https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/iso
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Figure 2: Example frames from BF and each PAS along with their corresponding log-likelihood matrices below them.
Red pixels show the location of anomalies from the perspective of the PixelCNN++ model. From left to right: BF,
Cosmetic Makeup, Impersonation Makeup, Obfuscation Makeup, Half Mask, Mannequin, Paper Mask, Silicone Mask,
Transparent Mask, Print, Paper Cut, Funny Eye, Paper Glasses, and Replay.
Figure 3: Average and standard deviation of the log-likelihood matrices over training data in the first column, along
with the average log-likelihood matrices for test BF data and each individual PAS in the same order as in Figure 2.
in both known and unknown attack detection scenarios. Lastly, the few-shot learning capacity of the proposed method
is investigated and the computational cost of the pipeline is reported.
6.1 Representation Adequacy
Figure 2 shows examples of the log-likelihood matrices extracted by the PixelCNN++ model for sample frames from
BF data as well as each attack species. It can be seen that BF data shows few single anomaly pixels corresponding to the
natural variations in the BF frame as well as anomalies around the location of the glasses. However, each attack species
shows its own pattern of anomalies corresponding to the locations where it is observed. For example for the obfuscation
makeup attack, the anomalies correspond to where the eyebrow and beard lines are drawn, for the mannequin attack
they correspond to the skin regions, for the paper mask to the fold locations, and for the replay attack to the overexposed
regions of the face. These examples show the capacity of the representation to provide explainability at pixel-level.
To further analyze the unique patterns from each attack species, the average log-likelihood matrix for each species is
presented in Figure 3. The average and standard deviation of log-likelihood values for training BF data are shown in the
first column. From these two images, it can be seen that most of the natural variability in the training data corresponds to
the eye and the nasal dorsum as well as the background, while the periocular region of the face contains a lower natural
log-likelihood. After normalization of the average log-likelihood matrices for test data using these two matrices, it can
be seen that the test BF data matches the training BF data average, while each attack species show a different pattern for
low likelihood and high likelihood regions. Attacks with unusually high likelihood over the skin region are cosmetic
makeup, impersonation makeup, half mask, mannequin, silicone mask, print, and partial cut attacks. This effect can be
interpreted as the over-smoothness of skin texture in these attacks. Attacks with unusually low likelihood over the skin
are obfuscation makeup, paper mask and to some extent transparent mask, which can, in turn, be interpreted as severe
anomalies in the skin texture. As expected, partial attacks show anomalies in the region of the image where the attack is
applied to.
Figure 4 shows the t-SNE embeddings [71] of the normalized average pixel log-likelihood matrices from each video.
From this figure, it is evident that the representation manages to cluster attacks from the same species together with few
exceptions. Furthermore, it shows a good separability between BF data and presentation attack data, while the training
BF data distribution overlaps with the test BF data.
6.2 One-class classification
The performance of both anomaly measures in the proposed one-class classification scheme, along with the combined
one-class detection score for each species is presented in Table 1. Even though the EER values for the detection of
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Figure 4: The t-SNE graph on the average log-likelihood matrices for all the data available in the SiW-M dataset. Each
point represents a video, and each attack species is visualized with a different shape and color. The training BF data is
shown with gray dots while the test BF data is shown with pink pluses. A clear separation is visible between BF data
and attack data.
Table 1: Detection performance for each of the anomaly measures and their combination.
EER [%] Replay Print Mask Makeup Partial MPAHalf Silicone Trans. Paper Mann. Obf. Imp. Cosm. FunnyEye P.Glasses P.Cut
Agg. Log-Likelihood 22.08 22.23 19.57 23.99 37.69 29.86 19.09 24.41 16.53 25.88 24.00 37.08 22.23 37.69
Anomaly Energy 13.96 17.64 16.67 29.97 23.86 23.13 20.34 37.85 1.52 22.39 33.54 27.02 18.97 37.85
Combination 15.23 12.47 14.46 25.84 27.08 23.89 11.55 22.99 3.15 23.12 24.18 26.66 15.13 27.08
individual attacks, with the exception of impersonation makeup attack, are far from acceptable, these anomaly measures
show a balanced performance across all attack species. To see the effect of the number of PCA components in the
detection rate, Figure 6 shows the average as well as the maximum EER over all species after filtering out the first n
components from the PCA representation. It can be seen that, as hypothesized, the last PCA dimensions contain a
significant amount of attack-unspecific discriminative information.
The correlation between the aggregated log-likelihood measure and the anomaly norm measures is 0.15 signifying the
complementing potential of these measures on each other. The combination scores reflect the complementary nature of
these measures and results in a detector with an MPA attack detection EER of 27.1%. The DET curve for the resulting
one-class detector is shown in Figure 5 for all attack species.
6.3 Detection Performance
In the following, the detection performance in terms of MPA EER is presented and analyzed for the detection of known
attacks, unknown attacks, and few-shot learning.
6.3.1 Known attacks
The performance of the proposed methods in comparison to the existing detection methods which are applied to the
SiW-M dataset is reported in Table 2. It can be seen that even though the proposed method is outperformed on most
individual attacks, the focus of the loss function on the MPA resulted in a lower EER on the difficult attack species,
namely cosmetic makeup. As a result, the proposed discriminative detector achieves 9.7% EER on the MPA, reducing
the MPA EER by 37% compared to the best existing detector. The proposed fusion mechanism further reduces the
MPA EER to 8.5%. The DET curve for the proposed discriminative detector is shown in Figure 7.
12
A PREPRINT - OCTOBER 6, 2020
Figure 5: Detection error trade-off curve for the one-class detector in PAD task.
Figure 6: Detection performance according to the starting PCA component before calculation of the energy.
Table 2: Performance comparison between proposed detection method and existing methods on the task of known
attack detection.
EER [%] Replay Print Mask Makeup Partial MPAHalf Silicone Trans. Paper Mann. Obf. Imp. Cosm. FunnyEye P.Glasses P.Cut
Auxiliary [30] 4.7 0.0 1.6 10.5 4.6 10.0 6.4 12.7 0.0 19.6 7.2 7.5 0.0 19.6
LLIG [31] 3.5 3.1 0.1 9.9 1.4 0.0 4.3 6.4 2.0 15.4 0.5 1.6 1.7 15.4
One-class 15.7 9.6 12.4 28.7 27.7 22.5 10.3 18.2 3.9 22.9 22.6 26.2 17.6 28.7
C-marmax 9.7 5.6 1.5 6.6 4.5 3.0 3.8 8.0 3.1 7.8 5.7 7.7 6.5 9.7
Fusion 6.1 7.3 3.6 4.5 4.5 3.8 4.8 8.0 1.5 7.8 4.3 8.5 3.4 8.5
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Figure 7: Detection error trade-off curve of the discriminative detector for the known attack detection on PAD task.
Table 3: Performance comparison of the proposed methods and the existing methods in the literature on the task of
unknown presentation attack detection.
EER [%] Replay Print Mask Makeup Partial MPAHalf Silicone Trans. Paper Mann. Obf. Imp. Cosm. Funny Eye Paper Glasses Paper Cut
SVM+LBP [24] 20.8 18.6 36.3 21.4 37.2 7.5 14.1 51.2 19.8 16.1 34.4 33.0 7.9 51.2
Auxiliary [30] 14.0 4.3 11.6 12.4 24.6 7.8 10.0 72.3 10.1 9.4 21.4 18.6 4.0 72.3
DTN [35] 10.0 2.1 14.4 18.6 26.5 5.7 9.6 50.2 10.1 13.2 19.8 20.5 8.8 50.2
CDC [23] 9.2 5.6 4.2 11.1 19.3 5.9 5.0 43.5 0.0 14.0 23.3 14.3 0.0 43.5
LLIG [31] 6.8 11.2 2.8 6.3 28.5 0.4 3.3 17.8 3.9 11.7 21.6 13.5 3.6 28.5
One-class 15.2 12.5 14.5 25.8 27.1 23.9 11.6 23.0 3.2 23.1 24.2 26.7 15.1 27.1
C-marmax 12.2 10.5 27.5 8.2 22.7 13.4 4.3 17.0 0.8 11.3 33.5 33.2 11.1 33.5
Fusion 10.4 6.5 20.3 10.9 24.6 3.0 3.5 23.0 1.5 12.8 25.1 27.8 7.1 27.8
6.3.2 Unknown Attacks
The results for the proposed method along with the performance of existing detectors in unknown attack conditions are
presented in Table 3. It can be seen that, as expected, the one-class detector performs better than all discriminative
detection methods in terms of MPA EER, including the proposed method. However, it is worth mentioning that the
discriminative detectors gain an advantage over certain PASs where there is a similarity of the discriminative features
between the unknown PAS and the known ones used in training. The proposed fusion method managed to cap the EER
for the cases where the proposed discriminative detection method fails. Considering the existing solutions, it can be
seen that there only exists one approach that has a better than chance detection rate for MPA, namely LLIG [31].
6.3.3 Few-shot learning
In Table 4, the performance of the proposed method is presented on the task of few-shot learning when having one or
five examples, and compared to unknown and known cases. It can be seen that by observation of even one example
from an unknown PAS, the performance of the system improves, and the MPA EER is reduced by 45% to 18.3% by
observation of five examples. As such, the proposed system shows the capacity of significantly reducing the EER after
the presentation of a few examples of a new PAS.
6.4 Detection Cost
Due to the big size of the PixelCNN++ model, the extraction of each individual pixel log-likelihood matrix for each
frame is the bottleneck and takes roughly 75 milliseconds in our setup. Considering the average length of six seconds
14
A PREPRINT - OCTOBER 6, 2020
Table 4: Performance of the detector in few-shot learning scenarios.
EER [%] Replay Print Mask Makeup Partial MPAHalf Silicone Trans. Paper Mann. Obf. Imp. Cosm. Funny Eye Paper Glasses Paper Cut
Zero shot 12.2 10.5 27.5 8.2 22.7 13.4 4.3 17.0 0.8 11.3 33.5 33.2 11.1 33.5
One shot 14.8 10.5 22.6 7.6 18.3 6.2 4.3 15.9 0.8 14.7 30.2 26.4 13.3 30.2
Five shot 16.4 10.0 6.0 9.8 15.4 3.0 11.0 15.9 0.9 18.3 17.0 15.0 6.1 18.3
Known 9.7 5.6 1.5 6.6 4.5 3.0 3.8 8.0 3.1 7.8 5.7 7.7 6.5 9.7
for the 24 FPS videos in the dataset, processing each video takes 9 seconds. This may account for a prohibitively
high detection cost in certain applications such as smartphone-based detection or social media monitoring. However,
according to Eq. 2 the proposed method can find applications where the cost of a missed detection is high, such as
border control and authenticity verification in journalism.
7 Deepfake Detection
Figure 8 shows the average and standard deviation of log-likelihood matrices for training data along with the average
matrices for test data. It can be seen that most variations in the data are from the background, forehead, and cheeks,
while the eye and mouth regions had little variability with a low log-likelihood average. The BF test data average
matches that of training BF data. However, there are distinct patterns corresponding to each attack species. In the case
of Deepfakes and NeuralTextures, there is a high log-likelihood region on the lower half of the face, corresponding
to the possible over-smoothness of the texture. In the case of Deepfakes, there is a low-likelihood region around the
eyebrows and the chin line which corresponds to the locations where the artifacts that are the characteristic of Deepfakes
often occur. For the Face2Face technique, the pattern corresponds to points with low log-likelihood around the nose and
chin line, while for the FaceSwap technique, the pattern corresponds to the eyes, nose, and mouth region.
Figure 8: Average and standard deviation of the log-likelihood matrices over training data in the first column, along with
the average log-likelihood matrices for test BF and each individual attack species in the following order: Deepfakes,
Face2Face, FaceSwap, NeuralTextures.
Table 5 shows the performance of the one-class detector and the proposed discriminative detector as well as their fusion.
It can be seen that the one-class detector managed to achieve acceptable MPA EER of 8.21% while the discriminative
detector achieved near-perfect video level detection. The Fusion did not degrade the performance of the discriminative
detector significantly. It is important to mention that known attack detection on the raw subset of the dataset is a solved
problem with near-perfect frame-level detection rates reported in the baseline [49].
Table 5: Performance of the proposed detection methods for the task of known attack detection on Deepfake detection
task.
EER [%] DeepFake Face2Face FaceSwap NeuralTextures MPA
One-class 6.43 8.21 2.14 2.14 8.21
C-marmax 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.36 0.71
Fusion 0.71 0.36 0.00 0.71 0.71
Table 6 reports the detection performance on the LOO unknown attack detection scenario. The low EERs of the
discriminative detector shows that there are mutually discriminative features across the known and unknown attacks,
especially for Face2Face and NeuralTexture methods. Furthermore, the fusion mechanism managed to lower the MPA
EER significantly, and an MPA EER of 2.5% is achieved for the unknown attack detection. Due to the easiness of
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spotting digital manipulation traces in raw videos, the overall performances in terms of MPA are much lower than for
PAD experiments.
Table 6: Performance of the proposed detection methods for the task of unknown attack detection on Deepfake detection
task.
EER [%] DeepFake Face2Face FaceSwap NeuralTextures MPA
One-class 6.43 8.21 2.14 2.14 8.21
C-marmax 5.36 1.07 5.71 1.79 5.36
Fusion 2.50 1.43 2.50 1.43 2.50
8 Conclusion
The choice of the attack by a rational attacker can have a significant negative impact on the performance of the detection
systems in real-life scenarios. In response, after relying on game theory to build a theoretic basis and formulating the
interactions between the attacker and the defender, a new detection method is proposed to optimize the performance
against attacks from such attackers. Experiments on the tasks of presentation attack detection and Deepfake detection
show the effectiveness of the proposed method in improving the detection rate on most powerful attacks both in known
attack cases and when the detector faces unknown attacks. Furthermore, the proposed feature set is capable of enabling
few-shot learning and explainability at pixel-level.
Despite the proposed method outperforming the state-of-the-art in the task of presentation attack detection, its expected
27.8% performance against the most powerful unknown attack is still far from acceptable for real-life applications,
showing the need for further research in this direction. However, the availability of more training data from a more
diverse set of attacks may alleviate this limitation.
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